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Abstract
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) faces much severer financial constraint compared
to large companies and it is more vulnerable to market imperfection. To alleviate SMEs’
financial constraints, Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) have been introduced and
widely used around the world. We first provide a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of
the traditional CGSs and then introduce an innovative financing contract, referred to as
equity-for-guarantee swap (EGS), with the aim of reducing SMEs’ financial constraint in a
more effective way. We show that EGS effectively reduces information asymmetry between
lenders and SMEs and alleviates SMEs’ severe financial constraint. We further investigate
the impact of maturity on asset prices under EGS contract and analyse the value-at-risk
(VAR) and expected shortfall (ES) of the insurer’s risk exposure when participating in the
EGS contract. Consistent with pecking order theory, an extension of our model shows that
an SME tends to use equity financing first when it faces much severer financial constraint,
then the SME issues more debt when it is less financially constrained.
Keywords: SMEs, equity-for-guarantee swap, financial constraint, risk management
1. Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are often hailed as the backbone of developed
and developing economies. It is a consensus that SMEs play a vital role in economic growth,
employment creation, boosting foreign trade and poverty alleviation (Ayyagari et al., 2014).
Across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, SMEs
account for 99% of all businesses and between 50% and 60% of value added. Almost one
person out of three is employed in a micro firm with less than 10 employees and two out of
three in an SME, also SMEs are the main drivers of job creation (OECD, 2019). However,
its impact on economic and social development can be hampered by difficulties in securing
Email addresses: pengchengsong@xjtu.edu.cn (Pengcheng Song), hai.zhang@strath.ac.uk (Hai
Zhang), zhaoqin@pku.edu.cn (Qin Zhao)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier July 15, 2020
finance, such as access to credit and market-based finance (Cressy, 2002; Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Berger et al., 2005; Canales and Nanda, 2012).
The difficulty in accessing finance, of which is mainly due to existence of information
asymmetry between banks and SMEs, is a critical factor constraining the development of
SMEs (Wellalage and Fernandez, 2019). Lin and Sun (2006) point out that SMEs are more
opaque than large firms and own fewer assets that can be taken as collateral, which makes
it more difficult for SMEs to access to bank loans. The most common and greatest credit-
constraints for smaller firms include high interest rates, high collateral requirements, and
complex procedures in obtaining bank loans (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2018). SMEs
might mitigate this problem by posting collateral or building close relationships with lenders.
Nevertheless, such solutions are of little help to firms which lack collateral or credit history
(Smith Jr and Warner, 1979; Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Padilla and Pagano, 1998; Coco,
2000; Pozzolo, 2004).
It is imperative to find ways to provide SMEs with stable and sustainable finance. This
is a topical issue especially in those regions where SMEs dominate an economy and the con-
straints have a higher impact (Brown et al., 2009). To alleviate SMEs’ financing constraint,
Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) have been widely proposed and adopted by banks and
governments around the world. A CGS mitigates the credit risk faced by lenders through
the absorption of a portion of the lender’s losses by a third-party. It is believed that CGSs
are effective in improving SMEs’ credibility and information disclosure. The World Bank
considers Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) as an efficient way to solve the financing prob-
lem for SMEs, and releases the principle of public Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs in
20151. More than 79% of bank loans were insured (World Bank Enterprise Surveys). The
amount of guaranteed loans was more than twice the amount of equity financing during the
first half of 2013 (Shan and Tang, 2019).
CGSs aim at providing financial support to SMEs suffering from insufficient investment
from private financial institutions due to market failures and lack of collateral. In this way,
CGSs can enhance the competitiveness of SMEs and finally to increase SME’s accessibility
to private financing sources. According to Wilcox and Yasuda (2008); Leonello (2018);
de Blasio et al. (2018) among others, CGSs have been proven to empirically increase loan
supply to SMEs. Respectively, in advanced economies for appraising small business financing,
guarantee scheme roughly supplies additional 9% financing than bank loan and promotes
10%-13% probability of getting a loan (Riding and Haines Jr, 2001; Berger et al., 2005;
Zecchini and Ventura, 2006). On the other hand, it shows that CGSs are capable to eliminate
the financing constraints in theory (Xiang and Yang, 2015).
Despite its popularity, scholars are skeptical about the financial sustainability of CGSs
(Vogel and Adams, 1997). The quality of financing instrument determines its sustainability
and alleviates the magnitude for SMEs’ financing constraint. CGCs normally charge guar-
antee fees on SMEs which can be detrimental to SMEs’ financing if the fees is unaffordable.
1The World Bank and FIRST Initiative. 2015. Principles for Public Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs.
Washington, DC: World Bank
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In converse, a low guarantee fee would not provide sufficient funding for a sustainable CGSs.
Therefore, pricing guarantee fee appropriately is crucial for boosting the CGSs’ sustainabil-
ity.
An insurer faces two typical issues. One is how to effectively reach its policy goals of
maintaining a reasonable guarantee capacity for SMEs without damaging its financial health.
The other is how to accurately evaluate the risk status of applicants and its guarantee
cost. Normally, the guarantee fee (interest rate premium) is set according to the differential
between the lending rate for non-guaranteed loans and the rate for guaranteed loans. While
for SMEs without much collateral, it might pay higher interest rates to access to bank loans.
The research on whether contributions to the guarantee fund from the public sector may
improve or deteriorate the information gathering incentives for Credit Guarantee Scheme has
been controversial. On the one hand, public funds raise a potential moral hazard problem.
On the other hand, the presence of public funds in a Credit Guarantee Scheme might convey
a positive signal to banks about the Credit Guarantee Corporation’s capacity, which could
attract further external funds that may be used as additional collateral to reduce the expected
losses borne by banks should a SME default (Honohan, 2010).
Saito and Tsuruta (2018) suggest that CGSs may increase adverse selection and moral
hazard if CGSs cannot distinguish between low- and high-risk borrowers, as the scheme will
be more attractive to risky borrowers. Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced
renewed interest from governments keen to promote financial access for SMEs, not least as
a response to the credit crunch in advanced economies.
Another disadvantage of most CGSs around the world is that the guarantee fee is fixed
throughout the guarantee period without considering the applicant’s ever-changing credit
status. This practise of no constant monitoring afterwards undoubtedly causes severe moral
hazard problems for insurers. In turn, higher default rates and larger amounts of honoring
costs will bring CGS to a disaster. Although Kuo et al. (2011) attempt to establish a
theoretically sound and practically reasonable model to estimate guarantee fees which reflects
an applicant’s credit status, there is still a lots remain to be done in the pricing of guarantee
fees Therefore, insurers urgently need to pursue a reasonable and applicable method of
adjusting guarantee fees according to applicants’ risk dynamics throughout the guarantee
period.
The operational design apparently influence the cost and effectiveness of differential CGSs
(Honohan, 2010). To strength CGS, an innovative instrument called Equity for Guarantee
Swap (EGS) has been proposed (Yang and Zhang, 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016;
Luo et al., 2016; Tang and Yang, 2017). An EGS is a three-party CGS agreement among a
bank, a insurer/guarantee company, and an SME, where the SMEr obtains a loan from the
bank and, if the SME defaults on the loan, the insurer must pay all the outstanding interest
and principal to the bank. In return, the SME transfers part of the ownership as a form
of guarantee fee, then the insurer will receive capital gain and dividend from the SMEs for
compensation. Inspired by Yang and Zhang (2013), we borrow concepts from the insurance
market based on the similarity between guarantee fees and insurance premiums. To be more
specific, we blend actuarial pricing theory into the traditional risk-neutral probability of
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default model to investigate insurers’ risk exposure signing EGSs contracts. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous research has adopted such methodology in credit guarantee
pricing.
The pricing framework of our research is closely related to the one in Leland and Toft
(1996). Leland (1994) first examines the market value of corporate debt and optimal leverage
with closed-form solutions. Further, Leland and Toft (1996) investigate the term structure
of the debt and equity with a focus on the analysis of the debt maturity. Goldstein et al.
(2001) propose a model based on EBIT and identify another form of optimal capital structure.
However, none of the above studies focuses on SMEs financing. In fact, SMEs facing severe
financial constraint might not be able to choose the optimal structure. Featuring SMEs
financial constraint, varying maturities of contingent claims, and the risk exposure of insurers
in an unified dynamic model is another key contribution of this paper.
In this paper, we develop a model of entrepreneurial financing in which credit is rationed
because of moral hazard, rather than adverse selection problems. In line with prior work
by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2001). Our model proves that EGS dominates
CGS regarding its effect on alleviating SMEs’ severe financial constraint, leading to a Pareto
improvement.
Although Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary (2018); Wang et al. (2015) have conducted a
thorough analysis on EGS contracts, they ignore the risk exposure for the insurer as they
assume that the insurer signs a large number of EGS contracts with various SMEs and thus
the idiosyncratic risk would be fully diversified. We argue that it is worthwhile to investigate
the risk exposure for the insurer who signs “large” numbers of EGS contracts as no one knows
how “large” is sufficient. Therefore, we calculate common risk measures (VaR and ES) of
insurer’s risk exposure when participating EGS business. Our numerical results illustrate
that the insurer breaks even in the long run while makes profit in the short run. We further
identify that the main source of insurer’s risk exposure comes from SMEs’ default risk.
At last, we extend our benchmark model to relax our previous assumption and assume
that SMEs could finance project via using both equity and guaranteed loan. Consistent with
Myers and Majluf (1984)’s pecking order theory, our model claims that an SME tends to use
equity financing first when it faces much severer financial constraint, then the SME issues
more debt when it faces less financial constrained.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops an unified framework
of CGS and EGS pricing which illustrates the innovative EGS outperforms the traditional
credit guarantee scheme, leading to a Pareto improvement. Section 3 investigates the impact
of varying maturities on asset prices, followed by an indepth analysis of the insurer’s risk
exposure in Section 4. Section 5 presents numerical results on SMEs optimal structure, asset
prices with varying maturities, and risk exposure of insurers as well. Further, an interesting
model extension of SMEs financing featuring both equity and debt financing via EGS has
been explored in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes and all proofs and technical staffs
are gathered in Appendices.
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2. Benchmark Model: Traditional Credit Guarantee Schemes vs the Innovative
Equity-for-Guarantee Swaps
Following Leland (1994), we assume that the EBIT of a SME, denoted by η, follows a
Brownian motion which is not affected by the capital structure of it. The process of EBIT
ηt satisfies
dη = µηdt+ σdZ, η0 given, (1)
where the growth rate µη and volatility σ are constant, Z is a standard Brownian motion
defined on the filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P). Define dQdP = e−ρηMZt−
1
2
ρ2η2M t with
ηM being the Sharpe ratio of the market, then the stochastic process η under risk-neutral
measurement is
dη = µdt+ σdZQ, (2)
where µ = µη − ρσηM is the growth rate of the EBIT under risk neutral measure.
Consider a security whose price is denoted by F (ηt, ~g(t)), where ~g(t) = (g1(t), g2(t)...gi(t)...)
denotes a vector of cash flow to be paid to the holder and it might be negative. Define the
cash flow of the security as CF (ηt, ~g(t)). Using Itoˆ formula, the security price F (ηt, ~g(t))
satisfies the following ordinary differential equation
µFη +
σ2
2
Fηη + CF = rF, (3)
with a general solution of (3) given by
F (ηt) = A1e
k1ηt + A2e
k2ηt + h(ηt, ~g(t)), (4)
where
k1,2 =
−µ±√µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
A1, A2 and h(ηt, ~g(t)) are determined by specific boundary conditions.
2.1. Traditional credit guarantee schemes
Due to the high risk of SMEs, it is usually hard for SMEs to access bank loans unless
a third party (an insurer for example) agrees to pay the remaining debt should an SME
default. Here we consider only a fully protected loan, which means the insurer pays all the
residual value of the loan once the SME defaults.
Denote the coupon rate of the loan as CL, and the principle as P , then a perpetual loan
will satisfy CL/r = P . In practice, the insurer normally charges an extra premium as the
guarantee fee denoted by CG, which could be referred as an increase of the coupon rate for
the SMEs. Therefore, the total coupon rate C that the SME pays equals to CG + CL. For
SMEs shareholders, the cash flow is CF = (1 − τf )(ηt − CG − CL) and the equity price
E(ηt, ηBC , CG + CL) satisfies
µEη +
σ2
2
Eηη + (1− τf )(ηt − CG − CL) = rE. (5)
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Denote the bankruptcy threshold as ηBC , once the EBIT drops to ηBC the SMEs will be
liquidated. In such case, the market value of the equity will be zero. Then, the boundary
conditions of traditional CGS are as follows:
E(ηBC , ηBC , CG, CL) = 0,
E(∞, ηBC , CG, CL) = (1− τf )(µ+ rηt − rCG − rCL
r2
).
(6)
Then the market value of equity can be expressed as:
E(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL) = (1− τf )[µ+ rηt
r2
− µ+ rηBC
r2
xB(ηt, ηBC)− CG + CL
r
(1− xB(ηt, ηBC))].
(7)
As for guarantee fee G(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL), it satisfies:
µGη +
σ2
2
Gηη + (1− τi)CG = rG. (8)
The boundary conditions for the market value of the guarantee fee is given by
G(ηBC , ηBC , CG, CL) = 0,
G(∞, ηBC , CG, CL) = (1− τi)CG
r
.
(9)
Then the market value of guarantee fee CG can be expressed as:
G(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL) = (1− τi)CG
r
(1− xB(ηt, ηBC)). (10)
As for market value of debt, denoted as D(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL, α), it satisfies:
µDη +
σ2
2
Dηη + (1− τi)CL = rD. (11)
The boundary conditions for the market value of the guarantee fee and the market value
of the loanD(ηt, ηBC , CL, α) can be expressed as
D(ηBC , ηBC , CG, CL, α) = (1− τi)(1− α)µ+ rηBC
r2
xB(ηt, ηBC),
D(∞, ηBC , CG, CL, α) = (1− τi)CL
r
.
(12)
The market value of loan is given by
D(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL, α) = (1− τi)[CL
r
(1− xB(ηt, ηBC)) + (1− α)µ+ rηBC
r2
xB(ηt, ηBC)] (13)
Furthermore, the guarantee fee CL and coupon rate CG satisfies
D(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL, α) +G(ηt, ηBC , CG, CL) = (1− τi)CL
r
. (14)
Then CG and CL satisfies the following equation:
CG =
[rCL − (1− α)(µ+ rηBC)]
r(1− τi)
xB(ηt, ηBC)
1− xB(ηt, ηBC) . (15)
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2.2. Equity-for-Guarantee Swap Pricing
We hereafter summarise key results from Yang and Zhang (2013).Under Equity-for-
Guarantee swap, the guarantee fee is paid to the insurer by a certain portion of SMEs
equity. Different from the traditional CGS, the cash flow that bank receives under EGS is
(1− τi)C. Thus, the ODE that E(ηt, ηB, C) that satisfies is given by
µEη +
σ2
2
Eηη + (1− τf )(ηt − C) = rE, (16)
with boundary conditions as follows which are similar to (6):
E(ηB, ηB, C) = 0,
E(∞, ηB, , C) = (1− τf )(µ+ rηt − rC
r2
).
(17)
According to (16), we can derive the market value of the equity as
E(ηt, ηB, C) = (1− τf )[µ+ rηt
r2
− µ+ rηB
r2
xB(ηt, ηB)− C
r
(1− xB(ηt, ηB))]. (18)
Similarly, the time-invariant value of the debt with a coupon rate C, denoted byD(ηt, ηB, C, α)
satisfies
µDη +
σ2η
2
Dηη + (1− τi)C = rD, (19)
with boundary conditions defined as follows
D(ηB, ηB, C, α) = (1− τi)(1− α)µ+ rηB
r2
xB(ηt, ηB)
D(∞, ηBC , C, α) = (1− τi)C
r
.
(20)
In the same way, the market value of the debt is given as follows
D(ηt, ηB, C, α) = (1− τi)[C
r
(1− xB(ηt, ηB)) + (1− α)µ+ rηB
r2
xB(ηt, ηB)]. (21)
And the fair market value of the guarantee should be
G(ηt, ηB, C) =
[rC − (1− α)(µ+ rηB)]
r2
xB(ηt, ηB) (22)
The insurer will take part of the SME’s equity for compensation. The shares β requested
by the insurer is solved by
β =
G(ηt, ηB, C)
E(ηt, ηB, C)
. (23)
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2.3. Optimal Capital Structure
Now we turn into the optimal capital structure problem for SMEs under both the tra-
ditional CGS and EGS-CGS settings. We first look at the optimal capital structure under
EGS-CGS setting.
It’s trivial to solve the optimal bankruptcy threshold by maximizing the market value of
the equity according to the first-order condition
∂E(ηt, ηB, C)
∂ηB
= 0. (24)
The optimal bankruptcy threshold is given by
η∗B = C −
µ
r
+
1
k2
. (25)
The SMEs owner chooses the optimal debt level C∗ to maximise the total value with the
optimal bankruptcy threshold. The objective function is defined as follows
C∗ = arg max
C
{E(ηt, η∗B, C) +D(ηt, η∗B, C, α)}. (26)
Solving the above equation, the optimal coupon rate C∗ should satisfy
(τf − τi) + (αk2C∗ − τf )ek2ηt−k2C∗+k2µ/r−1 = 0. (27)
Under the framework of a traditional CGS, we define the bankruptcy threshold as ηBC
,the optimal bankruptcy threshold η∗BC , and the total coupon rate C
′. The new optimal
bankruptcy threshold should still satisfy (25) but with a new coupon rate C ′ = CG + CL,
and its expression is given by
η′∗BC = C
′
G + C
′
L −
µ
r
+
1
k2
. (28)
Similar to the previous case with EGS, the optimal coupon rate and guarantee premium
are solved by the following equation
C ′∗G , C
′∗
L = arg max
C′G,C
′
L
{E(ηt, η′∗BC , C ′G + C ′L) +D(ηt, η′∗BC , C ′L, α)}, (29)
subject to (15). We refer C ′L and C as the effective debt level under traditional CGS and
the innovative EGS respectively. Summarising the previous results, we have the following
two propositions
Proposition 1. The optimal effective debt level of EGS-CGS is higher than that of CGS,
which means EGS-CGS relieves more financial pressure than CGS. When the EGS-CGS and
CGS take the same effective debt level, the probability of default of the SME is lower with
the innovative EGS-CGS. The proposed innovative EGS-CGS is a Pareto improvement of
the traditional CGS.
The proof is provided in the Appendix A.
8
3. Asset Prices with Varying Maturities
Suryani (2020) point out that one of the problem of CGS is that it’s difficult to manage
the risk. As the EGS-CGS dominates the traditional CGS, here we consider only the risk
management of EGS-CGS contract. More specifically, We investigate the dynamic of the
assets’ value and the impact of maturity on the values of SME’s equity, guarantee, and bank
loan.
Firstly, the bankruptcy probability will be derived according to Shreve (2004), and it
will be used to derive the value of equity, EBIT and loan. Denote tB as the first passage
time of EBIT process to ηB, the bankruptcy probability of a SME defaulting before t can be
expressed as
Pr(tB ≤ t) = Pr(mt ≤ ηB) = Φ(−η0 + ηB − µt
σ
√
t
) + e−2(η0−ηB)µ/σ
2
Φ(
−η0 + ηB + µt
σ
√
t
), (30)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution, and
mt = mins∈[0,t]{ηs}. Here t should satisfy t < ∞. The Pr(tB ≤ t) is strictly monotonically
decreasing for ηt and µ, and strictly monotonically increasing for ηB and t.
It is a trivial to calculate the probability that a SME never goes bankruptcy as follows
Pr(tB =∞) = 1− e−2(η0−ηB)µ/σ2 . (31)
One should notice that the the probability has a flaw at∞. If we consider the probability
under the condition that the SME goes bankruptcy in a finite time, i.e. Pr(tB|tB < ∞),
then the bankruptcy time tB follows the inverse Gaussian distribution
Pr(tB|tB <∞) = e2(η0−ηB)µ/σ2Φ(−η0 + ηB − µt
σ
√
t
) + Φ(
−η0 + ηB + µt
σ
√
t
). (32)
3.1. Pricing equity with varying maturities
According to (30), the joint distribution of ηt and mt is derived as follows
Pr(ηt ≥ x,mt ≥ ηB) = Φ(−x+ η0 + µt
σ
√
t
)− e2µ(ηB−η0)σ−2Φ(2ηB − η0 − x+ µt
σ
√
t
). (33)
Then, the probability density function of ηt, conditioning on mt ≥ ηB, can be derived by
calculating the partial derivative of ηt:
f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB) = 1
σ
√
t
φ(
−ηt + ηB
σ
√
t
+ g1)− 1
σ
√
t
e−2(η0−ηB)µ/σ
2
φ(
−ηt + ηB
σ
√
t
+ g2), (34)
where g1,2 =
±(η0−ηB)+µt
σ
√
t
.
The expectation of EBIT at time t where t <∞ is given by
E[ηt,mt ≥ ηB] = σ
√
t√
2pi
e−
g21
2 +(µt+η0)Φ(g1)−e−2(η0−ηB)µ/σ2( σ
√
t√
2pi
e−
g22
2 +(µt+2ηB−η0)Φ(g2)).
(35)
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It is quite straightforward that we should discount the EBIT with different maturities.
However, according to (35), it is difficult to derive the expected return of the equity directly
by integrating the present value of (35) from 0 to t. According to Equation (18), the expect
return of future cash flow is only determined by EBIT ηt. Therefore, according to the law
of total expectation, the expectation of the capital return in future is given by
E[E[ηt, ηB, C]|ηt]] =
∫ ∞
ηB
E[ηt, ηB, C]f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt, (36)
where f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB) is the probability density function defined in Equation (34).
Consider Equation (18), we only need to calculate the expectation of xB(ηt, ηB). Now we
derive an important equation in our paper as follows
E[xB(ηt, ηB)] = Φ(j1)e
k2(η0−ηB)+rt + Φ(j2)ek1(η0−ηB)+rt, (37)
where
j1,2 =
∓(ηB − η0)− t
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
σ
√
t
.
The Equation (18) and (21) indicate the coefficient before the positive characteristic root
A1 must be 0 due to the second boundary condition. However, it still plays an important role
when considering varying maturities. When t comes to zero, the value of (37) approaches to
pB(ηt, ηB)
lim
t→0
[Φ(j1)e
k2(η0−ηB)+rt + Φ(j2)ek1(η0−ηB)+rt] = ek2(η0−ηB). (38)
When t goes infinity, we have
lim
t→+∞
[Φ(j1)e
k2(η0−ηB)+rt + Φ(j2)ek1(η0−ηB)+rt] = 0. (39)
Revisiting (36), we can break the integral into three parts
E[E(ηt, ηB, C)|ηt] = z1 + z2 + z3,
z1 =
∫ ∞
ηB
(1− τf )(µ− rC
r2
)f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt,
z2 =
∫ ∞
ηB
(1− τf )ηt
r
f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt,
z3 =
∫ ∞
ηB
(1− τf )C − µ/r − ηB
r
xB(ηt, ηB)f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt.
(40)
According to Equation (33),(35), and (37), the present value of E[E(ηt, ηB, C)] is given
as
S(t) = E(η0, ηB, C)− E[E(ηt, ηB, C)|ηt]e−rt. (41)
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3.2. The value of the insurer’s payment with varying maturities
According to (32), the cumulative probability distribution function of tB is given buy
with a flaw. However, it doesn’t affect the present value of future payment of the bank.
Thus, we have
lim
t→+∞
Lte
−rt = 0.
The probability density function is given by solving the partial derivatives2 of tB as
follows
f(tB) =
η0 − ηB
σ
t
−3/2
B
1√
2pi
e
− (ηB−η0−µtB)
2
2σ2tB . (42)
We first consider such an asset which receives one unit payment When the firm goes
bankruptcy before t and nothing otherwise. The expectation of the present value of one unit
payment, by integrating from 0 to t, is
E[L0, t] =
∫ t
0
e−rsf(s)ds = Φ(d1)eh1 + Φ(d2)eh2 . (43)
where
d1,2 =
−η0 + ηB ∓
√
µ2 + 2rσ2t
σ
√
t
,
h1,2 =
(−η0 + ηB)(−µ∓
√
µ2 + 2rσ2)
σ2
.
Assume that the SME goes bankruptcy at time tB, then the insurer pays
Dg(ηB, ηB, C) =
[rC − (1− α)(µ+ rηB)]
r2
. (44)
And the present value of the payment is given by
L0(tB) =
[rC − (1− α)(µ+ rηB)]
r2
e−rtB . (45)
According to Equation (43), we have
E[L0, tB] =
[rC − (1− α)(µ+ rηB)]
r2
(Φ(d1)e
h2 + Φ(d2)e
h1). (46)
As the present value of the payment is strictly monotonically decreasing for t, then
tB = Pr
−1(a) represents the bankruptcy time corresponding to the quantile a.
2This probability density function is informal, but it does not affect our conclusion.
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4. Risk Exposure of the Insurer
Theoretically, the idiosyncratic risk faced by an insurer could be diversified by investing
in a significantly large number of EGS contracts. Although the Law of Large numbers
holds when the insurer signs EGS contracts with a very large quantity of SMEs, it seems
impossible for an insurer to invest in such many EGS contracts. In fact, there might be
not many companies in the market and if the number of SMEs defaults during finite time
is larger than that expected, the excess part of loss of the insurer will exist permanently.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the risk exposure of the insurer.
Here we apply two familiar risk measurements for the insurer signing EGS contracts, i.e.
value at risk(VaR) and expected shortfall (ES, also called CVaR), which are given by
V aRa = inf
s
{Pr(L ≤ s) ≥ a},
CV aRa = E(L|L ≥ V aRa),
where a is the quantile of the distribution of the random variable L, i.e. the loss of a portfolio.
More specifically, the VaR of the random variable can be expressed as
V aRa[L0] = e
−rPr−1(a)(
C
r
− (1− α)µ+ rηB
r2
), (47)
and the expected shortfall of the random variable can be expressed as
ESa[L0] =
1
1− α
∫ V aRa
0
e−rPr
−1(a)(
C
r
− (1− α)µ+ rηB
r2
)f(t)dt. (48)
We consider that an insurer signs EGS contracts with N companies. N is a not small
number and not too large such that the central limit theorem could be applied to the analysis
the aggregate loss. We further assume that the SMEs are homogenous and have the same
characteristics, the random variables of the SMEs’ bankruptcy probability are independent
and identically distributed, i.i.d.
As a result, at a stopping time t < ∞, the numbers of bankrupted firms NB follows a
binomial distribution as follows
Pr(NB = nB) =
(
N
nB
)
pnB(1− p)N−nB (49)
where p = Pr(tB ≤ t) is the bankruptcy probability according to Equation (30). When
N is large, using the central limit theorem, the distribution of number of firms that goes
bankruptcy follows a Gaussian distribution Normal(Np,Np(1− p)),
Pr(NB ≤ nB) = Φ( nB −Np√
Np(1− p)) (50)
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Thus, the present value of the random variable before t is
L0[t] =
{
0 tB > t,
e−rtB(C
r
− (1− α)µ+rηB
r2
) tB ≤ t.
(51)
We rewrite the expectation of L0 considering the risk free interest rate r as follows
var[L0, tB, r] = E[L
2
0, tB, r]− (E[L0, tB, r])2 = E[L0, tB, 2r]− (E[L0, tB, r])2. (52)
According to the central limit theorem, the distribution of the present value of aggregate
loss before tB ,denoted by L
a
0, follows a Gaussian distributionNormal(NE[L0, tB, r], Nvar[L0, tB, r])
Pr(La0 < l) = Φ(
l −N ∗ E[L0, tB, r]√
N ∗ var[L0, tB, r]
). (53)
Finally, VaR and ES of the present value of aggregate payment are given by
V aRa[L
a
0] = N ∗ E[L0, tB, r] + Φ−1(a)
√
N ∗ var[L0, tB, r], (54)
ESa[L
a
0] = N ∗ E[L0, tB, r] + ESa(Normal(0, 1))
√
N ∗ var[L0, tB, r]. (55)
Given a fixed η0, the ES and VaR are both time-variant risk measurements, which provides
flexibility regarding the analysis of risk exposures of the insurer.
As for the whole EGS contract, We consider the difference between the equity return and
compensation payment of an insurer which is defined as follows
CG(t) =
∫ t
i=0
(1− τf )β(ηs − C)e−rs1{ms≥ηB}ds− Le−rs1{ms=ηB}
=
∫ t
i=0
(1− τf )βηse−rs1{ms≥ηB}ds− [(L−
C
r
)e−rs +
C
r
]1{ms=ηB}
(56)
First we consider the case of a standard Brownian motion where an SME never goes
bankruptcy. If the process of P&L follows a standard Brownian motion zt, then CG becomes
CG(t) =
∫ t
0
e−rszsds,
and the variance of CG can be expressed as follows
var(CG(t)) =
∫ t
0
(
∫ s
0
e−r(s+τ)σ2τdτ +
∫ t
s
e−r(s+τ)σ2sdτ)ds,
and
var(CG(t)) =
∫ t
0
(
∫ s
0
e−r(s+τ)σ2τdτ +
∫ t
s
e−r(s+τ)σ2sdτ)ds,
=
t
r2
e−2rt +
1
2r3
− 2
r3
e−rt +
3
2r3
e−2rt.
(57)
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When interest rate r approaches zero, we have limr→0CG(t) = 13σ
2t3.
Similarly, denote[(L− C
r
)e−rt + C
r
]1{mt=ηB} as L(t), we can derive the variance of capital
gain in a general case as
var(CG(t)) =(1− τf )2β2
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
e−r(s+τ)cov(ηs1{ms≥ηB}, ητ1{mτ≥ηB})dτds
− 2(1− τf )β
∫ t
0
e−rscov(L(t), ηs1{ms≥ηB})ds+ var(L(t)).
(58)
The covariance of ηs1{ms≥ηB}, ητ1{mτ≥ηB} can be expressed as follows
cov(ηs1{ms≥ηB}, ητ1{mτ≥ηB}) =E[E[ητ1{mτ≥ηB}ηs1{ms≥ηB}|ητ1{mτ≥ηB}]]
− E[ητ1{mτ≥ηB}]E[ηs1{ms≥ηB}].
(59)
The VaR and ES of an insurer who has signed a given N EGS contracts can be calculated
using numerical methods.
5. Numerical Analysis
We have derived optimal capital structure of an SME under both the CGS case and the
innovative EGS case in Section 2, asset pricies with varying maturities in Section 3, and
insurers’ risk exposure in Section 4. In this section, we provide numerical results to develop
more economic intuition on the innovative EGSs contract. Baseline parameters are chosen
according to Yang and Zhang (2013) among others. Table 1 summarises the parameter
values used in our baseline case.
5.1. Optimal capital structure between the traditional CGS and the innovative EGS
Overall, the proposed EGS dominates the traditional CGS regarding its effect on alle-
viating SMEs’ severe financial constraint. The optimal coupon rate for EGS and CGS are
presented in Figure 1a which shows the “effective” coupon level is much higher under the
innovative EGS than that under the traditional CGS. As expected, SMEs borrow less loan
when the EBIT volatility is higher, whixh can be explained by an increased default risk in
such case.
Consistent with Figure 1a, the optimal capital structure illustrated in Figure 1b indicates
SMEs under EGS optimally choose higher leverage compared with the traditional CGS case.
More specifically, the optimal leverage for an SME borrowing loan via EGS is over 90% while
the figure for an SME under CGS is just over 50 %.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the SME’s guarantee cost and its project quality.
In most cases, an SME will to give up below 10% of its equity as guarantee fees for debt
financing. The guarantee cost rises to over 35% for SMEs with poor quality projects, i.e.
lower expected growth rate and high risk.
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Table 1: Summary of key parameters in baseline case
Parameter Symbol Value
EBIT value of the firm at time 0 η0 10
Bankruptcy threshold ηB 4
Expected growth rate of EBIT under real probability measure P µ 0.25
Expected growth rate of EBIT under risk neutral measure Q µη 0.01
Risk free interest rate r 0.05
Volatility of EBIT σ 0.6
Sharp ratio of the market ηM 0.4
Correlation coefficient between the SME and the market ρ 1
Number of insured SMEs N 1000
Bankruptcy cost ratio α 50%
Effective tax rate τf 0.48
Continuous coupon rate C
Time of bankruptcy tB
Payment to the debtor when tB = t Lt
Maturity of the loan M
(a) Optimal coupon level (b) Optimal capital structure
Figure 1: Comparison of optimal capital structures between CGS and EGS
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Figure 2: EBIT quality (i.e. the expected growth rate and the volatility) and its impact on guarantee cost
5.2. The impact of maturity on asset prices
Figure 3 presents the present value of an insurer’s payment to the bank with varying
maturities should an SME default. As expected, the insurer’s payment to the bank is larger
for a longer maturity debt as this would increase an SME’s bankruptcy probability. On the
contrary, the insurer’s payment would be smaller for an SME with a higher expected growth
rate or a lower volatility project, as the default risk in both cases are much lower.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: The impact of varying maturities on payment with different levels of growth rate and volatility
Figure 4 presents the value of equity for different maturities with different levels of growth
rate and volatility. As expected, the longer the SME survives, the higher the value of its
equity. Against the intuition, the equity value would be lower for a higher expected growth
rate and a lower volatility. This is mainly because that the SMEs in such cases issues more
debt.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: The impact of varying maturities on equity value with different levels of growth rate and volatility
5.3. Insurers’ risk exposure
We assume the insurer signs N = 1000 ESG contracts in our numerical experiment. The
expected number of defaulted SMEs is presented in Figure 5 and the expected payment in
Figure 6.
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Figure 5: The number of defaulted firms.
Figure 6: The insurer’s expected payment should SMEs default.
In the short run case with the maturity t ≤ 10 years, only a few of companies get
liquidated, thus the insurer’s payment to the bank is smaller. However, over 40% (more
than 400) SMEs default in the long-term which results a higher expected payment by the
insurer.
When combining the equity income gained from EGS contract, the insurer breaks even
in the long run as its capital gain approaches to zero as shown in Figure 7a. While in the
short run, due to few SMEs defaults, the insurer has positive profit on average with its VaR
and ES both being positive as well.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: The insurer’s capital gain (CG) and its variance composition
We further investigate the key sources of the risk of capital gain in Figure 7b. More
specifically, we find that the largest portion of the variance of capital gain comes from the
variance of payment, which indicates the main resource of the risk associated to the EGS
contract is from the default risk of firms.
6. Model Extension: Debt or Equity?
Consider the model mentioned in Section 2, what is the impact of an additional equity
investment on the firm? In this section we attempt to address an SME’s optimal financing
choice, i.e. debt or equity?
6.1. SMEs’ optimal financing structure
Here we consider an interesting extension of our basic model by introducing equity fi-
nancing option to SMEs. In the benchmark model, we assume SMEs finances its capital
via guaranteed bank loan only. Here, we relax our previous assumption and assume that
SMEs could finance project via using both equity and guaranteed loan. One advantage of
introducing equity financing is that it boosts the growth rate of SMEs.
Assume that ηt is continuous, the coupon rate C is determined by the loan level L, and
the volatility σ is constant, the following condition should be satisfied
E(ηt, C(L), µ) + I = E(ηt, C(L), µ
′), (60)
which is consistent with that the additional equity investment boosts the growth rate µ′.
From the perspective of the SME, it plans to make equity financing I and debt financing
L subject to a exogenous financing constraint A to maxmise the firm value. We take ηt as
constant, then denote E(ηt, C(L), µ) as E(C(L), µ). Equation (60) means that an additional
equity investment will promote the growth rate of the EBIT of the firm without affecting
its volatility. After receiving the equity investment, the firm will choose a new optimal
bankruptcy threshold, η∗B = C(L)− µ′/r − 1/k2, to maximise its market value.
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For the reason that E(C(L), µ) is strictly monotonous increasing for µ, there exists a
unique µ′ that satisfies (51) and is determined by L and I. Then we can rewrite the market
value of equity under this condition as
E(C(L), µ(I, L)) = E(I, L). (61)
Now we can define the objective function of the SMEs as follows3
V (I, L) = Pr(tB =∞)[E(I, L) + (1− τi)L−Dg(I, L)− I]. (62)
The optimization problem for the firm can be expressed as
max
I,L
V (I, L),
s.t.I ≥ 0,
L ≥ 0,
I + L ≤ A.
(63)
We should notice that there is no closed-form solution for Equation (62), thus, a numerical
method has been employed to find the optimal capital structure of the SMEs.
6.2. Simulation results
As no closed-form solution obtained for SMEs’ optimal financing structure, we here pro-
vide a comprehensive numerical analysis investigating the key determinants of SMEs’ optimal
capital structure.
Firstly, we investigate the effect of financial constraint (also referred as budget constraint)
on SMEs’ optimal financing decisions. As indicated in Figure 8, firms generally tend to issue
more debt, a higher leverage, when they have decent budget and face no or little financial
constraint (i.e. the budget constraint A ≥ 250). On the contrary, an SME issues more equity
when it has limited budget and faces severe financial constraint. Our numerical results are
consistent with the pecking order theory first proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). To be
more specific, when the financial budget is tight, A = 50, of which 40 comes from equity
issue, only 10 from debt issue, as indicated in Figure 9b.
3According to L = C/r, we can conclude directly that ∂v(0,rC)∂C equals to the left side of (27).
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: optimal financing structure with different levels of growth rate and volatility
Secondly, we focus on the effect of project quality on optimal capital structure decisions.
Figure 8a shows that SMEs with higher growth potentials, on average, choose higher leverage
ratios, the effect of which is stronger when financial constraint is much more severe. For
example, an SME with µ = 0.7 chooses its optimal financing leverage of around 76%, while
only 65% for an SME with µ = 0.4.
Lastly, we analyse the impact of volatility on the optimal capital structure decisions. As
it can be seen from Figure 8b and 9a, the higher the volatility or the riskier of the project is,
the smaller the optimal financing leverage ratio. This is straightforward as a higher EBIT
volatility leads to a higher default risk, which further reduces SMEs’ incentive of issuing debt
due to the greater bankruptcy cost. Moreover, such detrimental effect on debt issuance is
much stronger when SMEs face much more severe financial constraint.
(a) (b)
Figure 9: Optimal financing structure with different levels of budget constraint and volatility
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7. Conclusion
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) plays a crucial role in the global economy
not just for employment creation and being the engines of economic growth, but also being
considered as a forceful tool of poverty alleviation in most developing and undeveloped coun-
tries. However, SMEs face much severer financial constraint compared to large companies
and they are more vulnerable to market imperfection. In this paper, we propose an innova-
tive credit guarantee scheme with EGS to alleviate such severe financial constraint faced by
SMEs.
We first develop an unified dynamic SMEs financing model which provides a thorough
analysis and comparison of the traditional CGS and the innovative EGS. Our model proves
that EGS dominates CGS regarding its effect on alleviating SMEs’ severe financial constraint,
leading to a Pareto improvement.
Moreover, we calculate common risk measures (VaR and ES) of insurer’s risk exposure
when participating EGS business. Our numerical results illustrate that the insurer breaks
even in the long run while makes profit in the short run. We further identify that the main
source of insurer’s risk exposure comes from SMEs’ default risk.
Finally, we extend our benchmark model to relax our previous assumption and assume
that SMEs could finance project via using both equity and guaranteed loan. Consistent
with the pecking order theory, an SME tends to use equity financing first when it faces
much severer financial constraint, then the SME issues more debt when it faces less financial
constrained.
Appendices
Appendix A The proof of Proposition 1
According to Section 2, we can conclude that C∗ is the only extreme point for Equation
(27), then the extreme point satisfies the first order condition of (29). Further, C∗ satisfies
dE(ηt, η
∗
B, C)
dC
+
dD(ηt, η
∗
B, C, α)
dC
= 0, (A.1)
and {
dE(ηt,η∗B ,C)
dC
+
dD(ηt,η∗B ,C,α)
dC
> 0 C < C∗,
dE(ηt,η∗B ,C)
dC
+
dD(ηt,η∗B ,C,α)
dC
< 0 C > C∗.
(A.2)
If we substitute C ′ = C ′G + C
′
L, the first order condition for Equation (29) can be rewritten
as
dE(ηt, η
′∗
BC , C
′)
dC ′
+
dD(ηt, η
′∗
BC , C
′, α)
dC ′
(1− dC
′
G
dC ′
) = 0. (A.3)
It is obvious that
dC′G
dC′ > 0 holds when C
′
G, C
′
L satisfies (15).
22
According to Equation (21), we know dD(ηt,ηB ,C,α)
dC
> 0, then we can conclude that, in
order to satisfy the first order condition of traditional credit guarantee scheme, the optimal
coupon rate C ′∗ must be smaller than C∗ using a EGS. Now we have proved Proposition 1.
Appendix B The impact of maturity on asset prices
B.1 Pricing a unit payment with different maturities
E[L0, t] = E[e
−rtB , tB ≤ t]
= E[e−rtB1[tB≤t]]
=
∫ t
0
e−rsf(s)ds
=
∫ t
0
η0 − ηB
σ
s−3/2
1√
2pi
e−
(ηB−η0−µs)2
2σ2s e−rsds
=
∫ t
0
η0 − ηB
σ
s−3/2
1√
2pi
e−
(−
√
µ2+2rσ2s+(ηB−η0))2
2σ2s e−
√
µ2+2rσ2(ηB−η0)−µ(ηB−η0)
σ2 ds
=
η0 − ηB
σ
σ
η0 − ηB e
−
√
µ2+2rσ2(ηB−η0)−µ(ηB−η0)
σ2 [Φ(
(ηB − η0)−
√
µ2 + 2rσ2t
σ
√
t
)
+ e
2
√
µ2+2rσ2(ηB−η0)
σ2 Φ(
(ηB − η0) +
√
µ2 + 2rσ2t
σ
√
t
)].
(B.1)
B.2 The value of EBIT with different maturities
E[ηt,mt ≥ ηB] =
∫ ∞
ηB
ηtf(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt. (B.2)
The probability density function is given as follows
f(ηt = x,mt ≥ ηB) = 1
σ
√
t
φ(
−x+ η0 + µt
σ
√
t
)− e
2µ(ηB−η0)σ−2
σ
√
t
φ(
2ηB − η0 − x+ µt
σ
√
t
). (B.3)
E[ηt,mt ≥ ηB] =
∫ ∞
ηB
x
σ
√
t
φ(
−x+ η0 + µt
σ
√
t
)−e
2µ(ηB−η0)σ−2x
σ
√
t
φ(
2ηB − η0 − x+ µt
σ
√
t
)dx , J1+J2
(B.4)
Firstly, we solve J1
J1 =
∫ ∞
ηB
x
σ
√
t
φ(
−x+ η0 + µt
σ
√
t
)dx. (B.5)
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Define xˆ = −x+η0+µt
σ
√
t
. Then
J1 =
∫ −ηB+η0+µt
σ
√
t
−∞
(
η0 + µt√
2pi
e−
1
2
xˆ2 − σ
√
t√
2pi
xˆe−
1
2
xˆ2)dxˆ,
= (η0 + µt)Φ(
−ηB + η0 + µt
σ
√
t
) +
σ
√
t√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(
−ηB+η0+µt
σ
√
t
)2
.
(B.6)
Use the same method to define x˜ = 2ηB−η0−x+µt
σ
√
s
, we have
J2 = −
∫ ∞
ηB
e2µ(ηB−η0)σ
−2
x
σ
√
t
φ(
2ηB − η0 − x+ µt
σ
√
t
)dx,
= −e2µ(ηB−η0)σ−2
∫ ηB−η0+µt
σ
√
t
−∞
(−σ
√
tx˜√
2pi
e−
1
2
x˜2 +
2ηB − η0 + µt√
2pi
e−
1
2
x˜2)dx˜,
= −e2µ(ηB−η0)σ−2 [ σ
√
t√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(
ηB−η0+µt
σ
√
t
)2
+ (2ηB − η0 + µt)Φ(ηB − η0 + µt
σ
√
t
)].
(B.7)
Appendix C Expected value of pB(ηt, ηB)
The expected value of pB(ηt, ηB) can be expressed as
E[ek2(ηt−ηB)] =
∫ ∞
ηB
ek2(ηt−ηB)f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt. (C.1)
Similar to the previous approach adopted in Appendix B, we divide the right side of the
above equation into two parts O1 and O2
O1 =
∫ ∞
ηB
1
σ
√
t
φ(
−x+ η0 + µt
σ
√
t
)ek2(ηt−ηB)dx, (C.2)
O2 = −
∫ ∞
ηB
e2µ(ηB−η0)σ
−2
σ
√
t
φ(
2ηB − η0 − x+ µt
σ
√
t
)ek2(ηt−ηB)dx. (C.3)
Define xˆ =
x−η0+
√
µ2+2rσ2t
σ
√
t
, then
O1 =
∫ ∞
ηB−η0+t
√
µ2+2rσ2
σ
√
t
φ(x)ek2(η0−ηB)+rtdx. (C.4)
In the same way, define x˜ = 2ηB−η0−x+µt
σ
√
t
, then
O2 =
∫ ∞
−(ηB−η0)+t
√
µ2+2rσ2
σ
√
t
φ(x)ek1(η0−ηB)+rtdx. (C.5)
24
C.1 Second order expectation of EBIT
It is vital for an insurer to know its risk exposure signing EGSs contracts. To calculate the
VaR of the capital gain of such contract during finite time, we derive first the second-order
expectation of the EBIT at time t is as follows
E[η2t ,mt ≥ ηB] =
∫ ηB
−∞
η2t f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt. (C.6)
According to Appendix B, it is trivial to use the same transformation to integrate Equa-
tion (C.6),
E[η2t ,mt ≥ ηB] = Q1 +Q2, (C.7)
where
Q1 = [σ
2t+ (η0 + µt)
2]Φ(g1) +
σ
√
t(η0 + ηB + µt)√
2pi
e−
1
2
g21 ,
Q2 = −e2µ(ηB−η0)σ−2{[σ2t+ (2ηB − η0 + µt)2]Φ(g2) + σ
√
t(3ηB − η0 + µt)√
2pi
e−
1
2
g22}.
C.2 Second order expectation of equity value
The second order expectation of E(ηt, ηB, C) is given as follows∫ +∞
ηB
E2(ηt, ηB, C)f(ηt,mt ≥ ηB)dηt = γ1 + γ2 + γ3 + γ4 + γ5, (C.8)
where
γ1 =
∫ +∞
ηB
[(
µ− rC
r2
)2 + (
ηt
r
)2]f(ηt)dηt,
γ2 = 2
∫ +∞
ηB
(
µ− rC
r3
)f(ηt)dηt,
γ3 = −2
∫ +∞
ηB
(
µ− rC
r2
)(
µ− rC + rηB
r2
)xB(ηt, ηB)f(ηt)dηt,
γ4 = −2
∫ +∞
ηB
(
µ− rC + rηB
r2
)
ηt
r
xB(ηt, ηB)f(ηt)dηt,
γ5 =
∫ +∞
ηB
(
µ− rC + rηB
r2
)2x2B(ηt, ηB)f(ηt)dηt.
(C.9)
After some calculation, we can give that∫ +∞
ηB
ηtxB(ηt, ηB)f(ηt)dηt = [
σ
√
t√
2pi
e−
1
2
j21 + (η0 −
√
µ2 + 2rσ2t)]Φ(j1)e
k2(η0−ηB)+rt
+ [
σ
√
t√
2pi
e−
1
2
j22 + (2ηB − η0 −
√
µ2 + 2rσ2t)]Φ(j2)e
k1(η0−ηB)+rt,
(C.10)
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and ∫ +∞
ηB
x2(ηt, ηB)f(ηt)dηt = Φ(λ1)e
k2η0−2
√
µ2+2rσ2tek2(η0−ηB)
+ Φ(λ2)e
k2(2ηB−η0)−2
√
µ2+2rσ2tek1(η0−ηB),
(C.11)
where
λ1,2 =
±(ηB − η0) + µt+ 2
√
µ2 + 2rσ2t
σ
√
t
.
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